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COMMENTS
Disc, DAT and Fair Use: Time To Reconsider?*
INTRODUCTION
The fate of the controversial digital audio tape (DAT) record-
ers, scheduled for release in the United States in 1988, was the
subject of heated debate in the 100th Congress.' The main issue
with DAT, as was the case with the analog 2 cassette in the 1960s
and 1970s, is whether home taping or "piracy" 3 of copyrighted
sound recordings is at odds with the purpose of granting copy-
rights in the first place.- This debate pits the interests of the re-
* This article was entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. Digital audio tape (DAT) is to the digital compact disc (CD) what the analog
cassette tape is to the LP record. DAT recorders are a new generation of cassette tape
recorders capable of digital recording; potentially, directly from CD's. DAT provides the
extremely high quality sound of a CD, but in a cassette tape format. DAT is more conven-
ient and better adapted to portable and auto players than are compact discs. For an excel-
lent explanation of the technical workings of DAT recorders, See Birchall, Digital Audio
Tape: Issues and Answers, STEREO REVIEW, Mar. 1987 at 56. See also All You Need to
Know About DAT (Except Marketing), AuDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL, June 1987 at 26.
Release dates for DAT recorders are still in the future. Two companies, Marantz and
Harman Kardon, have said they will introduce DAT machines in the United States some-
time in 1988. Riggs, Sony, CBS And Copy Code, HIGH FIDELITY, Feb. 1988 at 6. DAT
players for the car, however, have been on sale in the United States since February 1988.
These car tape decks are player-only models and, thus, avoid the entire copyright issue.
DAT on the Road: Inauguration of a Technology, AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL, Mar.
1988 at 23.
2. There are two ways to record musical information on magnetic tape-analog and
digital. Analog recording involves transcribing a continuous range of frequencies onto the
tape. Digital recording involves transcribing a series of on/off pulses which represent bi-
nary numbers (zeros and ones) like those used with computers. Put very simply, the range
of frequencies which arrive at the analog tape recorder can be diminished or distorted (i.e.
other sounds are picked up in the signal) during transmission of the signal to the recorder.
This means that the newly recorded tape is of a lower quality than the original recording
from which the signal is taken. With the new digital recorders, the signal reaching the
recorder is essentially identical to the original signal and so the recording is of almost
identical quality as the original.
3. Piracy is defined as the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings; the term
usually refers to such duplication in a commercial sense (i.e. for sale in competition with
the original recording) as opposed to individual home duplication. Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The Copyright Act has ac-
complished this by granting a limited monopoly to the copyright owner. The legislative
1
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cording industry directly against the interests of DAT recorder
manufacturers and consumers.
The recording industry fears huge losses of revenue5 because
consumers will now be able to make "master" quality copies of
CDs onto a digital cassette tape.' The other side of the issue,
maintained by the Home Recording Rights Coalition,7 asserts that
the currently proposed anti-copy chip" legislation interferes with
an individual's right to make private, noncommercial copies.9
committee report on the Copyright Act of 1909 states "the policy is believed to be for the
benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention, to give
some bonus to authors and inventors." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
5. Jason Berman, President of the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA), reported that in 1983 alone Americans taped $3.8 billion worth of music onto
cassettes, compared to record and prerecorded tape sales revenue of $1.5 billion. Digital
Audio Tape Recorders: Hearings on H.R. 1384 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Con-
sumer Protection and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1987) [hereinafter Digital Hearings] (statement of Jason
Berman, President of Recording Industry Association of America).
6. The recording industry argues that unchecked copying and the resulting loss of
revenue will affect the recording companies' ability to invest in new artists and will enable
them to fund only proven artists. This, the industry asserts, will provide less incentive for
future creativity and will result in a limitation of new consumer choices. According to
Berman, the amount of new music released into the market in the last eight years has
already declined by 40%. Digital Hearings, supra note 5, at 36. Record companies take a
substantial risk in recording the majority of musical artists. Only 16-20% of all records
ever recover the costs involved to make them. It is this small percentage that must subsi-
dize the large numbers of releases that fail. The "break even point" is the number of copies
of a record that have to be sold in order to recover the cost of making, packaging, and
promoting the record. According to a 1980 study by Cambridge Research Institute, the
breakeven point for 33rpm record albums in 1979 was 140,600 copies sold. Of the 3,575
record albums released during 1979, 84% failed to recover the costs, resulting in losses of
more than $200 million. In 1980-81, the breakeven point had risen to 200,000 copies sold.
T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRAC-
TICES § 2.08 (1986). Recording artists themselves also fear the threat that DAT presents to
their continuing royalties. "The simple truth is that they are choking off our livelihoods,"
says Country singer Emmylou Harris. Digital Hearings, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of
Emmylou Harris, recording artist).
7. The Home Recording Rights Coalition includes companies that are involved in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of audio cassette recorders, audio tape, and related
equipment. Membership also includes many prominent trade associations and consumer
groups. For a listing of members see Digital Hearings, supra note 5, at 89-90 (statement of
Charles Ferris, Home Recording Rights Coalition).
8. The proposed legislation, discussed in more detail at section V infra, would require
all DAT recorders entering the United States to contain an anti-copy chip. This anti-copy
chip is designed to disable the DAT recorder when the user attempts to record specially
encoded copyrighted works.
9. Digital Hearings, supra note 5, at 86 (statement of Charles Ferris, Home Record-
ing Rights Coalition). Ferris says that home taping may actually help the record industry.
"Home taping has the documented effect of encouraging purchases of prerecorded music..
. . [N]ew recording products [such as the VCR and DAT] . . . wind up creating even
greater markets for new prerecorded material." Id. The RIAA maintains that blank tape
sales are up while prerecorded tape sales are declining. Id. at 33-35. Ferris denies that any
evidence exists that positively links the sale of blank tapes to massive home copying. Id. at
87. The Coalition commissioned a study which found that home recorders who tape the
most also buy the most records and CDs. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Why Ameri-
2
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Despite the magnitude of lobbying efforts by both sides, the
home taping issue has never been satisfactorily resolved by the
legislature or by the courts.10 This Comment provides a discussion
of the basic issues surrounding copyright in sound recordings. It
presents a brief history of copyright in sound recordings, leading
to the present state of the law regarding home taping. It also dis-
cusses and analyzes the proposed anti-copy chip solution which
was hotly debated in the 100th Congress. This Comment argues
that anti-copy chip legislation is not the appropriate solution and
proposes that a royalty applied to recorder and blank tape sales in
return for an exemption of home taping from infringement will
lead to a better result. Such a solution would compensate the
copyright owner for use of the copyrighted work, yet provide the
public with useful access to new technology. This solution, thus,
fits well with the purpose of granting copyright. 1
I. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS
The Copyright Act of 197612 provides that sound recordings
may qualify for copyright protection. Sound recordings are de-
fined in the Act as: "works that result from the fixation of a series
of musical, spoken or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects, such as discs, tapes or
other phonorecords14 in which they are embodied." 15 Clearly, this
definition would include the fixing of sounds on digital audio tape,
thus entitling these tapes to copyright protection. However, sound
cans Tape, at 61-62 (1982). The study also found that very few home recorders use bor-
rowed materials to tape. Id.
10. There have been many legislative solutions offered to combat home recording
"piracy" but they have had little success in Congress. See infra notes 103-07, 112 and
accompanying text. There have been no challenges in court specifically addressing home
audio taping as copyright infringement. But cf Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (addresses home video taping and copyright).
11. See supra note 4.
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982). The owner of a copyright has certain exclusive
rights with regard to the copyrighted material. In the case of sound recordings, these rights
are listed in 17 U.S.C. § 114 and will be discussed in more detail infra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text. Anyone who violates these exclusive rights is an infringer of the copy-
right. The copyright owner has certain remedies (prescribed by the Act) available to him/
her against the infringer-usually damages. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-10 (1982).
14. "Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompa-
nying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "pho-
norecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982).
15. Id.
1988]
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recordings have not always enjoyed copyright protection. 6
The Copyright Act of 190917 contained no provision recognizing
copyrights in sound recordings. Moreover, the congressional com-
mittee report on the 1909 Act shows that Congress intended that
sound recordings be excluded from copyrightability.' The com-
mittee stated:
It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of
copyright to mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to
give the composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accor-
dance with the provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and use
of such devices.19
The rationale behind denial of copyright to sound recordings was
that Congress could only grant copyrights for "writings."20 At the
time of the 1909 Act, sound recordings were not considered "writ-
ings" within the meaning of the Constitution.21
That sound recordings were not copyrightable remained the
view of the courts22 and the Copyright Office23 until 1945 when
Professor Chafee reasoned to a different conclusion.24 He argued
16. Copyright in the sound recording should be distinguished from copyright in the
underlying musical work that is the subject of the sound recording. Copyright in the under-
lying musical work belongs to the composer of the music and was recognized even prior to
the 1909 Copyright Act. Copyright in the sound recording belongs to those who put the
recording together in the "phonorecord"-this can include the orchestra (band), the vocal-
ists, or the producers.
17. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. The Copyright Act of 1909 was the
first comprehensive statute enacted by Congress under its power to grant copyright deriving
from article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
18. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
19. Id.
20. The congressional power to grant copyright is derived from article I, section 8,
clause 8 of the Constitution: "To promote the Progress of ... the useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ... 
(Emphasis added). U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. "By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of... authors, and
Congress very properly has declared these [writings] to include all forms of writing, print-
ing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas of the mind of the author are given
visible expression." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (em-
phasis added). See also White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908) and Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
22. See, e.g., Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912);
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); RCA Mfg.
Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940); Jerome v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) afid, 165 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948).
23. Ringer, (Barbara A.) The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, U.S.
Copyright Office Study No. 26, Feb. 1957.
24. Chafee, Reflection on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUm. L. REv. 719, 734
(1945). Chafee saw that orchestras and other musical performers were losing earnings
from potential ticket buyers to recordings made of their performances. Id. at 733. The
persons selling these recordings did not compensate the musicians and were benefitting at
the musicians' expense. Id. The use of common law theories of unfair competition (See,
e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 489 (Ill. App. 1970); Columbia
4
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that the interpretation of "writings" as "visible expressions"2 5 was
outdated and that the Copyright Act needed to be drafted to ac-
commodate "the progress of invention."26 He asserted that sound
recordings should be construed as "writings" within the meaning
of the Constitution and should be copyrightable.2 7
Ten years after Chafee's article, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit embodied his conclusion in its decision of Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.2" The court in Capitol
Records expressly held that sound recordings were excluded from
copyright under the 1909 Act, but that they may be capable of
copyright under the Constitution as a "writing."2 9 Such views,
favoring copyright in sound recordings, eventually led to the 1971
amendment to the Copyright Act of 190930 and finally the 1976
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 492 (I11. Cir. Ct. 1970)) to recover
such lost earnings were not always viewed very favorably by the courts. RCA Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
Chafee felt some form of statutory protection was needed for the musicians. Chafee, supra,
at 734.
25. See supra note 21.
26. Chafee, supra note 24, at 737. Chafee wrote: "'A word is not a crystal, transpar-
ent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.'" Id. at 735
(quoting Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
27. "The copyright clause in the Constitution should be construed so as to permit
Congress to protect by appropriate devices any literary or artistic work deserving of copy-
right protection." Chafee, supra note 24, at 735-36.
28. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
29. Id. The Supreme Court has since interpreted the copyright clause in the Consti-
tution: "These terms have not been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with
the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles." Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). The word "writings" may be interpreted "to include
any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor." Id. Congress
has the power to determine whether a "particular category of 'writing' is worthy of na-
tional protection." Id. at 559. As technology has expanded, Congress has responded by
providing protection for new categories of "writings":
In 1790-the first congressional copyright statute governed only books, maps, and
charts. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
In 1802-prints were given protection. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
In 1831-musical compositions and cuts in connection with prints and engravings were
added to the list of protected works. Act of Feb. 3, 1813, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
In 1865-photographs and photographic negatives were added as protected works. Act
of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
In 1870-the list was expanded to protect paintings, drawings, chromos, statues, statu-
ary, and models or designs intended to be perfected as works of fine art. Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
In 1909-Copyright Revision provided for eleven protected categories of works. Act of
March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
In 1912-the list was expanded to protect motion pictures. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch.
356, 37 Stat. 488.
In 1971-the list was finally amended to protect sound recordings. Pub. L. No. 92-140,
85 Stat. 391 (1971).
30. Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
5
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Copyright Act,31 each of which recognized copyright in sound
recordings.8 2
II. PROTECTION UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The Copyright Act grants a copyright holder "exclusive rights"
to use and to authorize the use of his work in five qualified ways.83
However, the exclusive rights in sound recordings given to copy-
right owners by the 1976 Act are limited to three: 4 1) reproduc-
tion,35 2) derivation,36 and 3) distribution. 7 Anyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner without permis-
sion is an infringer of the copyright.3 8 The owner is entitled to
certain remedies against an infringer as prescribed by the Act. 9
Home audio taping, being a reproduction of copyrighted sound re-
cordings without permission of the copyright owner, violates the
copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduction. There is no
question, then, that home audio recording is infringement. Or, is
there?
It has always been taken for granted that home audio taping is
not infringement. 40 In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Con-
gress, in 1971, when it amended the 1909 Act, did not consider
home audio taping to be infringement. The House Report to the
amendment states:
31. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) lists the five exclusive rights:
1) the right to reproduce the work;
2) the right to make derivative works;
3) the right to distribute copies of the work;
4) the right to perform the work; and
5) the right to display the work.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
35. Reproduction refers to the right to duplicate a sound recording in the form of
phonorecords or of copies of motion pictures and other audio visual works that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. Id.
36. A derivative work is a work based on a preexisting work. The exclusive right to
make derivative works of a sound recording is limited to the right to prepare a derivative
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed or
otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The limited right does not extend to the making of
another sound recording which merely imitates or simulates sounds in the copyrighted re-
cording. Id.
37. This refers to distribution of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. Id.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
39. Remedies for infringement under the Act include injunctions, impoundment and
other disposition of infringing articles, damages, profits made by the infringer, and court
costs and attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05 (1982).
40. There have been no court challenges to home audio taping as infringement. Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) was the only related challenge
but Sony spoke to home video taping. This case will be discussed at length at part IV infra.
6
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Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee to restrain
the home recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of
recorded performances, where the home recording is for private
use and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained
today, and the record producers and performers would be in no
different position from that of the owners of copyright in re-
corded musical compositions over the past 20 years. 1
The Copyright Act does provide for several specific exemptions
from infringement for certain uses,42 but there is no specific ex-
emption from infringement for home audio recording. Rather, it
appears that the authors of the amendment intended that such
home recording should be defensible as a fair use.43 Assuming the
41. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 1566, 1572. That home audio recording was not considered to be in-
fringement is further supported by colloquy on the floor of the House between Rep. Kas-
tenmeier (Chairman of House subcommittee responsible for the 1971 Amendment) and
Rep. Kazen:
Mr. Kazen: Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material
that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
Mr. Kastenmeier: Yes.
Mr. Kazen: In other words, if your child were to record off of a program that
comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used it for her own
personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not be included under the
penalties of this bill?
Mr. Kastenmeier: This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman
raises the point.
On page 7 of the report, under "Home Recordings," members will note that
under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for; namely, this is
considered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair use. The child
does not do this for commercial purposes. This is made clear in the report.
117 CONG. REc. 34, 748-49 (1971) (emphasis added).
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-18 (1982).
Section 107--exemption for reproduction for purposes such as criticism, comment, news-
reporting, teaching, scholarship or research.
Section 108-exemption for reproduction by libraries and archives.
Section 109--exemption for transfer of particular copy or phonorecord.
Section 110-exemptions of certain performances and displays.
Section 111-exemption of certain secondary transmissions.
Section 112--exemption for ephemeral recordings.
Section 113-scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.
Section 114-scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings.
Section 115-scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works: compulsory license
provisions.
Section 116-public performances by means of coin operated phonorecord players.
Section 117--computer programs.
Section 118-use of certain works in connection with noncommercial broadcasting.
43. 117 CONG. REc. 34, 748-49 (1971). The Copyright Act grants specific rights to
the copyright owner. The public may use a copyrighted work in a manner which does not
infringe upon these rights. In certain situations, however, potentially infringing uses are
allowed because they are reasonable under the circumstances. These special situations com-
prise what is known as the doctrine of fair use. Thus, fair use is actually a defense to a
charge of infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-07 (1982). Fair use will be discussed in
greater detail infra at section III.
1988]
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framers of the Act intended audio recording to be defensible as a
fair use, the question of whether home audio recording really is a
fair use of the copyrighted work still remains.
III. FAIR USE
The U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios Inc. stated, "[a]nyone ... who makes a fair use of the work
is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use." '44 In
other words, fair use allows an individual to use an author's origi-
nal work without that author's permission under certain condi-
tions. What these certain conditions are, however, is often difficult
to determine.45
The judicial doctrine of fair use4" was first given statutory rec-
ognition and is now partially codified in section 107 of the 1976
Copyright Act.47 Section 107 of the Copyright Act specifies criti-
cism, comment, newsreporting, teaching, scholarship and research
as possible fair uses.48 The Supreme Court has said, however, that
this list "was not intended to be exhaustive . . . or to single out
any particular use as presumptively a fair use."49 Whether a par-
ticular use is a fair use will depend upon the facts of the particu-
lar case" as well as a consideration of the four factors listed in the
44. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
45. The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, "the most troub-
lesome in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662
(2d Cir. 1939). It has also been called a doctrine "so flexible as virtually to defy defini-
tion." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. The term "fair use" first appeared in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). But twenty-eight years earlier, Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (no. 4901) spoke of a "nice balance" of interests that
settles the question of infringement.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no
more than give statutory recognition to the long-standing judicial doctrine of fair use; the
statute was not intended "to change, narrow or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5680.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Section 107 provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.
49. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985)
(The Court looked to § 101 of the 1976 Act for definitions of "including" and "such as").
"The endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in par-
ticular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659,
5680.
50. The doctrine of fair use has been termed an "equitable rule of reason." Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984). Thus, "each case rais-
ing the question must be decided on its own facts." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
8
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second sentence of Section 107.51 The four factors52 are: (1) The
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit, educational purposes;
53
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;54 (3) The amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole;55 and (4) The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work." 56
Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5679.
51. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st sess., at 62 (1967).
52. Listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
53. Two sub-issues are considered under this factor. The first is whether the use is
commercial, and the second is whether the use is productive.
A commercial use is presumptively an unfair use. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449, 451. But a
commercial, for-profit, nature does not necessarily negate a fair use determination. Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1983); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980). In this regard, the Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe crux of the profit/
nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price." Harper & Row, 472 U.S. at 562, 563.
Distinguishing between a productive and an unproductive use may also be helpful in
determining the balance, but such a distinction "cannot be wholly determinative" of a fair
use. Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984). When a
person "reproduces an entire work and uses it for its original purpose, with no added
benefit to the public," this is a non-productive use and "the doctrine of fair use usually
does not apply." Sony, 464 U.S. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
54. Courts have been more willing to recognize the defense of fair use when the
original work is a product "of diligence" such as a catalog, index or other compilation.
New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J.
1977). Conversely, the courts are less willing to recognize fair use if the work copied is
"creative, imaginative, and original." MCA, Inc., v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d, Cir.
1981). This is because the law generally recognizes a "greater need to disseminate factual
works than works of fiction or fantasy." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563. Thus, where an
original work is intended for entertainment uses, as opposed to informational purposes, it is
less likely that courts will accept a claim of fair use. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981). If a work is no longer in production and
thus no longer available for purchase at a fair price, there may be a valid reason to deem
copying of such a work a fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 108(e) (1982). See also Meeropol v. Nizer,
560 F.2d 1061 (1977).
55. Copying the copyrighted work in total is generally not a fair use. Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp.
v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). In addition to quantity, the court will look
to the quality of what was taken from the original work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564,
565.
56. This area is where the largest part of the controversy lies and where most courts
seem to place emphasis when deciding if a use is fair or not. "This last factor is undoubt-
edly the single most important element of fair use." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. Fair
use" 'is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of
the work which is copied.'" Id. (quoting I M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.10[D], at 1-87
(1984)). "If the defendant's work adversely affects the value of any of the rights in the
copyrighted work the use is not fair." Id. at 568.
The Supreme Court stated that the "immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate [the creation of useful works] for the general public good." Twentieth Century
1988]
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How much weight each factor carries in a fair use analysis, as
well as what other factors may be considered, has never been
clear. Congress has failed to provide any definitive rules.5 7 Nor
have any fixed criteria emerged from the courts."
After considering the four factors listed in Section 107, the
court next applies a balancing test weighing the public's interest
in the particular use against the interest of the copyright owner.5 9
If the public's interest in the use is important, and if the use does
not severely injure the copyright owner, then it will probably be
considered a fair use.60
IV. SONY CORP. V. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.
There is no case law specifically addressing the issue of home
audio recording as a fair use. But the Supreme Court in Sony did
address the issue of home video recording as a fair use.61 In Sony,
Universal City Studios (Universal) filed an infringement action
against Sony Corporation alleging that consumers were infringing
on Universal's copyrighted works by using videotape recorders
(VTRs) to record these works from commercially sponsored televi-
sion.2 Universal did not seek damages from the individual, alleg-
edly infringing, consumers. Rather, Universal alleged that Sony
was liable as a contributory infringer63 because Sony marketed
the VTRs knowing that consumers would use them to infringe."
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). In this light, the Court has stated that a
use for the work "that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the
value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's in-
centive to create." Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
57. Congress recognizes that these factors are "in no case definitive or determina-
tive" but only provide "some guage [sic] for balancing the inequities." H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.& ADMIN. NEws 5659,
5679.
58. "Courts have constructed lists of factors to be considered in determining whether
a particular use is fair, [but] no fixed criteria have emerged by which that determination
can be made." Sony, 464 U.S. at 475-76.
59. Id. at 454-55. "Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for
a sensitive balancing of interests." Id.
60. Id. at 454. See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
61. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.
62. Id. at 419.
63. "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materi-
ally contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory
infringer.'" Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
64. Sony, 464 U.S. at 419. The Sony case began as Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The district court denied Universal
the relief it sought and entered judgment for Sony. Universal appealed and the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. It held that Sony was liable for contributory
infringement and ordered the district court to fashion appropriate relief. Universal City
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The Supreme Court in Sony determined that the sale of copying
equipment did not constitute contributory infringement because
the product was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses."65 The
Court in Sony did not, however, resolve the issue of whether home
video recording in general constitutes a fair, and thus, noninfring-
ing use.66 Rather, the holding in Sony was a very narrow one. The
Court held only that home video recording for purposes of "time-
shifting"'67 was a fair use. The Court did not speak to the issue of
home recording for other purposes, for example, building a library
of movies or television shows.68 The Court has left these issues to
be decided at a later time. 9 Sony is, thus, not controlling with
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari (Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 457 U.S. 1116 (1982)) and
reversed the finding of the Ninth Circuit. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984).
65. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. The Court in Sony looked to the doctrine of contributory
infringement in patent cases as there was no precedent in the law of copyright for such an
imposition of vicarious liability. The Court stated that "when a charge of contributory
infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the
purchaser to infringe . . ., the public interest in access to that article of commerce is neces-
sarily implicated." Id. at 440. "[A] sale of an article which though adapted to an infring-
ing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a contrib-
utory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of commerce." Id. at 441 (citing Henry
v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled on other grounds; Motion Picture Pat-
ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)). "Accordingly, the sale of
copying equipment . . . does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes." Sony 464 U.S. at 442.
66. By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 ... Congress also
provided the solution to the 'record piracy' problems that had been created by the
development of the audio tape recorder. Sony argues that the legislative history of
that Act ... indicates that Congress did not intend to prohibit the private home
use of either audio or video tape recording equipment. In view of our disposition of
the contributory infringement issue, we express no opinion on that question.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.l 1 (emphasis added).
67. "Time shifting" involves using a videotape recorder to make a home recording of
a television program which one cannot view as it is being televised, and then watching this
recording at a later time. Id. at 421.
68. See supra note 66.
69. Even if Sony had addressed the issue of home video taping in general, a finding
of fair use is questionable. The decision in Sony was 5-4, with Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, Powell and Rehnquist dissenting. The majority based a large part of its decision on
the findings of the district court. Yet, even the district court was hesitant to speculate as to
the effects of home video taping. Referring to the harm claimed by Universal, the district
court stated, "[b]ecause this prediction of harm is based on so many assumptions and on a
system of marketing which is rapidly changing, this court is hesitant to identify 'probable
effects' of home use copying." Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 452. "This litigation
leaves many issues undecided... [but] [t]his court is bound by the factual context of this
litigation. The facts do not show harm to plaintiffs even if infringing activity has occurred.
... [T]his court does not minimize plaintiff's concerns. The new technology of videotape
recording does bring uncertainty and change which, quite naturally induce fear." Id. at 469
(emphasis added).
Had the issue in Sony not been so narrow, perhaps the outcome would have been differ-
ent. The issue addressed by the courts was whether Sony was liable for contributory in-
fringement and the relief sought was an injunction against the sale of the VCRs by Sony.
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regard to the home audio recording issue for several reasons. First,
the holding in Sony referred only to home recording for purposes
of time-shifting. Most home audio recording is not done for pur-
poses of time-shifting but, rather, is done to build a library of
tapes to be used many times over. Second, even if home audio
tapers recorded music off-the-air for purposes of time-shifting, the
differences with regard to compensation of the copyright owners
may disallow a finding of fair use.70 Third, the protection offered
to motion pictures and other audiovisual works have been ac-
corded full copyright protection since 1912,11 while sound record-
ing copyrights have not enjoyed such protection. 2
Since Sony is not controlling with regard to home audio taping,
The Court, however, seems to confuse the question of liability with the question of fashion-
ing an appropriate remedy. "In an action for contributory infringement against the seller
of copying equipment, the copyright holder may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks
affects only his programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an
interest in the outcome." Sony, 464 U.S. at 446, The Court cites no authority for this
statement. Since Sony was not a class action suit, and Universal did not speak for all
interested copyright holders, the Court did not allow the injunction. Thus, the case was
decided based on the relief requested and not on the issue of infringement or fair use.
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an
injunction which seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of commerce capable
of some non-infringing use would be an extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprece-
dented in copyright law." Id. at 444 (citing the district court, 480 F. Supp. at 468). Justice
Blackmun in his dissent recognized, however, that "[rlemedies may well be available that
would not interfere with authorized time-shifting at all." Id. at 494. In fact the court of
appeals had also mentioned alternative relief be considered when it remanded the case to
the district court. Id.
70. In the context of public television broadcasting, the user of the copyrighted work
is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The traditional method by
which copyright owners capitalize upon the television medium is predicated upon the as-
sumption that compensation for the value of displaying the works will be received in the
form of advertising revenues. Sony, 464 U.S. at 446 n.28. In the case of sound recordings,
there is no similar route for payment to copyright owners. Copyright owners are paid based
on how much radio air-time a particular sound recording receives and is paid by the radio
station through a licensing arrangement with The American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers (ASCAP) or the Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). Nimmer, Copyright
Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REv. 1505,
1532-33 (1982).
71. See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 488.
72. "Unlike the sound recording rights created by the 1971 amendment, the repro-
duction rights associated with motion pictures under § 106(1) are not limited to reproduc-
tion for public distribution; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work exists inde-
pendently, and the mere duplication of a copy may constitute an infringement even if it is
never distributed." Sony, 464 U.S. at 474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Section 106 grants
the copyright owner the exclusive right to control the performance and reproduction of his
work. "[T]he fact that he has licensed a single television performance is really irrelevant to
the existence of this right to control its reproduction. Although a television broadcast may
be free to the viewer, this fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public li-
brary may not be copied any more freely than a book that is purchased." Id. at 480
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). "These persons are willing to pay for the privilege of watching
copyrighted work at their convenience, as is evidenced by the fact that they are willing to
pay for VTR's and tapes; undoubtedly, most also would be willing to pay some kind of
royalty to copyright holders." Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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it provides little guidance as to what is a fair use of a copyrighted
audio recording. An application of the fair use factors73 to home
audio taping tends to lead to the conclusion that, in general, home
audio taping is not a fair use of copyrighted sound recordings. 4
73. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
74. An application of the fair use factors shows that home audio taping, in general,
should not be considered a fair use of copyrighted sound recordings. 1) Purpose and Char-
acter of the Use: The phrase "home taping" most commonly implies copying for personal,
non-commercial use. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Why Americans Tape 18-20
(1982) (study commissioned by the Home Recording Rights Coalition). Yet, the home
audio taper is "profiting" in a limited commercial sense in that he is gaining a new pro-
gram of music as well as portability, convenience and quality without paying the customary
price of compensation to the copyright owner usually included in the cost of prerecorded
music. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1985).
The home audio recorder generally tapes the copyrighted work to be put to the same use as
the original work (for entertainment) and, thus, is adding no productive use for the work.
For these reasons, fair use would probably not be found under this factor. See supra note
53.
2) Nature of the Copyrighted Work: The complex, creative nature of the production of
a sound recording, combined with the fact that the work produced is for entertainment
purposes, as opposed to dissemination of information, tends to suggest that a fair use would
not be found under this second factor. A possible exception might exist where the album or
tape is no longer in production. See supra note 54.
3) Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used: Either taping entire albums or
tapes or just the hit songs on those albums can be considered copying in the entirety be-
cause each individual selection on an album is a work that is copyrightable in itself. Copy-
ing in total, as such, would not be considered a fair use under this factor. See supra note
55.
4) Effect of Use on Potential Market for or Value of Copyrighted Work: Various stud-
ies have been done to determine the effect of home audio taping on the prerecorded music
market. The Roper Organization, Inc., A Study on Tape Recording Practices Among the
General Public (1979). Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Report of the Committee on Home
Taping (1979). CBS Records Market Research, Blank Tape Buyers-Their Attitudes and
Impact on Pre-Recorded Music Sales (1980). Warner Communications, Inc., Home Tap-
ing: A Consumer Survey (1982). The amount of loss to the recording industry caused by
home taping is not precisely known due to the ambiguous nature of the harm and because
it involves an activity occurring inside private homes. But, viewing the conclusions of these
studies as a whole, it can safely be said that the recording industry does suffer a substantial
loss of prerecorded album and tape sales at the hands of home tapers. This detrimental
effect of home audio taping on the market for pre-recorded music would demand that such
copying be denied as a fair use under this factor. See supra note 56. A problem with the
above studies, however, is that they assume that if home taping were not available, tapers
would purchase more records and prerecorded tapes. This assumption has not been sub-
stantiated and might preclude a finding of potential harm to the recording industry. Also,
these studies use blank tape sales as the basis for determining loss. Loss is difficult to
establish from blank tape sales because blank tapes have many uses besides taping pre-
recorded music. For example DAT is useful in the computer industry. DAT can store digi-
tal computer data and is easier to update and cheaper to duplicate than other methods of
computer data storage which are available. A determination of fair use under this factor
would turn on whether some "meaningful likelihood of future harm exists" from the partic-
ular use in question. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. If, under the first factor, the use is commer-
cial, this "likelihood" of harm may be presumed. Id. Since home audio taping can be con-
sidered a commercial use (as above) a presumption of harm arises and fair use is not likely
to be found under this fourth factor. Because home audio recording does not meet any of
the fair use criteria as set forth in § 107 of the Copyright Act, such activity should not be
exempt from infringement.
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Yet this conclusion does not settle the issue. With a case by case
analysis, 5 it would take many years to establish any kind of relia-
ble pattern of what constitutes a fair versus an unfair use with
regard to home audio taping. Should home audio taping be denied
status as a fair use, it would certainly be unreasonable to expect
individual home audio tapers to bargain individually with copy-
right owners over the right to tape each desired program. It would
be equally unfair to the recording industry to expect it to enforce
a prohibition on home audio recording. Enforcement proceedings
would cost the recording industry more than any profit it would
gain from such a prohibition on home audio taping. Also, the
problem of attaching a remedy if infringement is proven is very
difficult. 6 An alternative solution is needed concerning the issue
of home audio taping, especially considering the rapid growth in
recording equipment technology and the high costs of marketing
new prerecorded formats.
V. THE ANTI-COPY SOLUTION
Recently, the issue of home audio taping reached a new level of
attention in Congress77 with the pending release of DAT recorders
on the United States market.78 The advent of DAT recorders
brings no new issues to the home audio taping controversy. 79 How-
ever, the recording industry fears greater losses than ever to home
taping because of the higher recording quality of DAT and the
near perfect copies that can be made of CDs.
In response to concerns expressed by the recording industry
about DAT, an international committee consisting essentially of
audio equipment manufacturers suggested several electronic anti-
copying provisions to be applied toward manufacturers of DAT
recorders.80 The committee's chief provision called for the use of
different sampling rates," for example, 48- or 32-kHz for DAT as
75. See supra note 50.
76. This is exemplified by the Sony case, see supra note 69.
77. See infra notes 87-88. DAT has also received considerable attention in the Cali-
fornia legislature. A California bill, SB 1560 (1987), would have banned DAT machines in
California unless they contained the "anti-copy" chip. (Discussed infra at notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.) The California State Assembly Economic Development and New
Technologies Committee rejected the bill for lack of support. Manufacturing Update,
AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL Sept. 1987, at 38.
78. Marantz DAT recorders were originally due on United States markets in Octo-
ber of 1987. A parts supply problem has delayed its release. DAT Delay, STEREO REVIEW,
Dec. 1987 at 4. See supra note 1.
79. Consumers will not use DAT recorders any differently than they do other record-
ers (cassette and VCRs).
80. Feldman, Issues, AUDIO RETAILER, Nov. 1986 at 20.
81. DAT players measure sound levels intermittently. The sampling rate, in cycles
per second (Hz), is how often these measurements are taken. Simplified, a 44.1 kHz sam-
[Vol. 25
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opposed to 44.1-kHz for a CD. 2 This different sampling rate
would make it impossible to directly copy CDs to DAT in a "digi-
tal-to-digital" mode.83
The recording industry, not satisfied with the international com-
mittee's anti-copying provisions, went on to develop its own anti-
copy technology rendering the committee's provisions useless., 4 A
device called a "copy-code scanner chip" can now be built into the
recording mechanism of a DAT recorder.85 This device scans pre-
recorded discs (or records or tapes) for a special "copy-code. '8 6 If
the code is encountered, the chip will temporarily stop (for
twenty-five seconds) the recorder from taping.
This copy-code scanner chip was the subject of a number of
different bills introduced in Congress in 1987.7 Each of these bills
piing rate means that every second of sound is represented by 44,100 measurements. See
Burton, Tech Talk: Digital Audio Basics, AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 1987 at 55.
82. Feldman, Issues, AUDIO RETAILER, Nov. 1986 at 20.
83. It would be possible by electronic means, however, to convert the digital message
at 44.1-kHz from a CD to an analog message and then change this analog message back
into a digital message of 48-kHz, which a digital audio tape would accept. This, though,
would not be equal to making a true "master" quality copy. While this multiple translation
process does degrade the quality it is suggested that even this indirect mode of copying
(digital-to-analog and analog-back-to-digital) would probably not produce any noticeable
or detectable noise and distortion. Birchall, Digital Audio Tape: Issues and Answers,
STEREO REVIEW, Mar. 1987 at 56, 58-59. See also All You Need to Know About DAT
(Except Marketing), AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL, June 1987 at 26, 36 (edited by Chris-
topher Greenleaf). In any event, direct digital-to-digital copying from another DAT would
be possible if both tapes have the same sampling rate because there would be no need to
translate the message. Harrell, DAT Finally Released, STEREO REVIEW, Apr. 1987 at 18.
84. Although the first DAT recorders to come onto the market will have a sampling
rate of 48-kHz, DAT recorder manufacturers will most likely return to the same sampling
rate of CDs [44.1-kHz] so as to maintain a networking standard for the industry. Birchall,
Digital Audio Tape: Issues and Answers, STEREO REVIEW, Mar. 1987 at 56, 59.
85. CBS has developed a prototype "copy-code scanner chip." No such chip yet ex-
ists in production form, but the technical schematics have been developed. Slovick, DAT
Update, AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL, June 1987 at 38 (provides a good discussion of how
this chip works).
86. The "copy-code" consists of the removal of a "notch" of inaudible sound. That
is, a removal of sound signals within the audio frequency range of 3500 to 4100 hertz.
"Encoding" consists of an intermittent notch centered at 3,838 Hz, about 90 dB down and
125 Hz wide. Bulletin, STEREO REVIEW, Apr. 1987 at 1. Proponents of the anti-copy chip
system (mostly from the recording industry) maintained that the notch would not distort
the sound quality of an encoded recording, but this was disputed by the Home Recording
Rights Coalition. Slovick, DAT Update, AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL, June 1987 at 38.
As a result of this discrepancy, Congress requested The National Bureau of Standards to
investigate whether the anti-copy chip 1) achieved its stated purpose-the prevention of
DAT machines from recording; 2) diminished the quality of prerecorded material bearing
the notch; and 3) could be easily bypassed. The anti-copy chip failed on all three points.
World News: Copycode for DAT Damned in NBS Report, AUDIOVIDEO INTERNATIONAL,
Mar. 1988 at 8. The Home Recording Rights Coalition hopes that this finding will kill any
further attempts at anti-copy legislation, but this remains to be seen. Id.
87. One such bill was attached to the Trade and International Economic Policy Re-
form Act of 1987 (H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)) but was dropped from the Act as
it advanced to final consideration. The measure was dropped from the Trade bill primarily
1988]
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demanded that a copy-code scanner be inserted into all digital au-
dio recording equipment placed on the United States market.8
The main difference between the bills was the length of time the
provision would remain effective. For example, H.R. 1384/S. 506
contains a three-year sunset provision.8 9 On the other hand, H.R.
1155/S. 539 contains no sunset provision and would be a perma-
nent bar to the introduction of non-decoder equipped DAT
recorders.
There are several reasons why this anti-copy chip legislation is
not the appropriate solution to the home audio taping controversy.
First, even if anti-copy chip legislation were the appropriate
means to deal with home audio recording, such legislation should
be considered as an amendment to the Copyright Act. DAT legis-
lation should not be disguised by attaching it to miscellaneous
trade bills.90 Congress should face the issue for what it is: a copy-
because it was seen as too product specific. The House speaker felt the trade legislation
should apply a broad remedy rather than address the problems of a specific industry. Legis-
lation, 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 720, 721 (1987).
See also H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) and S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (introduced 2/19/87); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and S. 506, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced 2/5/87); H.R. 1603, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and
S. 635, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
88. H.R. 1155 (Trade, Employment & Productivity Act of 1987 Title III-Subtitle
C-Regulation of Commerce in Digital Audio Recording Devices Act of 1987) is represen-
tative of all three bills and provides:
Section 3302 (b) Digital Audio Recording Devices.-) No person shall import
into the United States, or manufacture, assemble, distribute, sell, resell, or lease,
or offer for sale, resale, or lease in commerce:
(A) any digital audio recording device which does not contain a copy-code scan-
ner; or
(B) any device, product, or service which has the primary purpose or effect of
bypassing, removing, or deactivating a copy-code scanner.
2) No person shall bypass or deactivate a copy-code scanner.
3) No person shall produce encoded phonorecords unless:
(A) the encoded phonorecords so produced are protected under title 17, United
States Code, and
(B) that person is a copyright owner or is authorized by the copyright owner to
produce the encoded phonorecords.
89. The "sunset provision" provides that the manufacturer will be required to insert
the anti-copy chip for three years to maintain the status quo while Congress comes up with
a permanent solution to the problem of unauthorized home recording.
90. See supra notes 87-88. Congress has never blocked the entry of new technology
into the United States unless there was a "danger" to the American public. National secur-
ity is not at issue with DAT and the recording industry has not proven that there will be
"serious economic damage" if DAT is allowed on the United States markets. In denying
access of unaltered DAT recorders to the United States it might set precedent that we will
come to regret in the future. Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.), chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee expressed his thoughts in this regard when he stated, "I think
the picture of a nation trying to lock out a new technology is not a pretty one." Quoted in
Marantz To Market DAT In Fall; Other Producers Unsure About U.S., VARIETY, June
1987 at 94.
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right issue.91
Second, sunset provisions, designed to maintain the status quo
until Congress devises a better solution are not acceptable.92 Such
provisions in the case of DAT recorders would have the same ba-
sic effect as a preliminary injunction against the sale of DAT re-
corders. No one will want to buy a recorder that cannot record, or
even play, any prerecorded music.93
Finally, use of anti-copy chips may be unconstitutional. The
purpose of copyright is to secure a monopoly for the author for a
limited time.94 With the anti-copy chip, recordings would be en-
coded to prevent copying of them during the term of their copy-
right.95 But after the term of protection expires, the obstacle to
copying would still remain. The effect would be an extension of
copyright protection for works long after they should have entered
the public domain.
Anti-copy chips may not be as helpful to the record industry as
appears at first glance. 6 Experience with anti-copy schemes for
91. The DAT legislation provides only band-aid therapy to the much larger issue of
home recording in both audio and video modes, and does not allow the kind of flexibility
that will be needed as technology gives rise to new formats for home recording devices.
92. The argument could be made that the anti-copy chips in the DAT recorders are
not preventing the copying of all recordings; and that they are only preventing the best
copies (i.e. digital copies) from being made. Concern has been expressed, however, that
should the proposed legislation pass, additional legislation would likely follow with similar
provisions making such a device mandatory in all other recording equipment, including
analog cassette and videotapes. Esse, It Can't Happen Here, HIGH FIDELITY, Apr. 1987 at
11.
93. One should note that the pending legislation contains provisions for the encoding
of phonorecords, and is not limited to encoding CDs. See supra note 88. This means the
recording industry could encode all phonorecords, including records, prerecorded tapes and
CDs, rendering the recording capacity of the DAT recorders useless except for off-the-air
taping or taping from older recordings. Since there are no prerecorded DATs available, nor
does it appear that the record industry intends to make them available immediately, even
the playing capacity of the DAT recorders would be useless. The recording industry con-
tends that it is unable to exploit DAT technology with prerecorded tapes because a com-
mercially feasible system for high speed DAT duplication has not yet been developed. Con-
trary to what has been claimed by the record industry, however, there is a commercially
feasible method of duplicating digital tapes called "contact-printing method" that is fast
(seven feet per second, i.e. 270 times the normal playing speed) and inexpensive. Birchall,
Digital Audio Tape: Issues and Answers, STEREO REviEw, Mar. 1987 at 56-59.
94. "The Congress shall have Power . . .To Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
95. In general, copyright in a work subsists from its creation and endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. §§
302-05 (1982). Once the term of protection expires, the work enters the public domain
which means that anyone may copy it without having to compensate the author for the
right to copy. In the case of a sound recording, the author is generally the record publish-
ing company.
96. It is interesting to note that not all factions of the recording industry are behind
anti-copy legislation. Stevie Wonder (recording artist on Tamla/Motown) has stated his
objections to the encoding process in written testimony saying that, "the process has the
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computer programs 9 7 demonstrates that most anti-copy schemes
are eventually defeated."" A bootleg market for the products used
to defeat the anti-copy scheme is usually created. Then the re-
cording industry will likely end up spending more money on en-
forcement of the anti-copy provision than it stands to gain from
it."9 There is also a problem in that the only way to effectively
enforce the use of the anti-copy chip would be to monitor the ac-
tions of private individuals in their own homes. This raises insur-
mountable practical enforcement problems as well as serious pri-
vacy concerns.' 00 The anti-copy chip solution, as discussed above,
is very problematic.
VI. TIME TO RECONSIDER?
Legislatively, there are two less problematic approaches in ad-
dressing the issues surrounding home audio taping. First, Con-
gress could by statute expressly exempt home audio recording
from infringement. Ever since the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the Sony Case' 01 found home copying to be an infringe-
ment of copyright, 10 2 Congress has been trying to exempt home
taping from infringement. Within days of the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision, bills were introduced in Congress to specifically exempt
noncommercial home videotaping from copyright liability. 03
effect of distorting the music.... [T]he integrity of my music will be compromised." Joe
Jackson (recording artist), speaking at A & M Record's 25th Anniversary Convention
stated that he supported the DAT format and that "the thought of people borrowing my
records from their friends and taping them has never bothered me .... [M]y concern is
that as many people as possible hear the music." Russ Solomon, President of Tower
Records retail chain, supported Jackson's position on DAT. The DAT Debate, STEREO RE-
VIEW, Sept. 1987 at 4.
97. Encryption: Can Spies and Thieves Break It? A Better Encryption Technique:
Maybe, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Nov./Dec. 1982 at 72-74.
98. At one point in the Sony trial in 1979, it was proposed that Sony install a
"jamming device" in its VCRs to prevent recording. Judge Warren Ferguson addressed
this proposal by stating that it would not help because "[a]s sure as you and I are sitting in
this courtroom today, some bright young entrepreneur, unconnected with Sony, is going to
come up with a device to unjam the jam. And then we have a device to jam the unjamming
of the jam, and we all end up like jelly." Boundas, Speaking My Piece, STEREO REVIEW,
July 1987 at 4, (citing J. LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND
THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1987).
99. For discussion of similar problems with computer anti-copy schemes, see gener-
ally Peterson, Computer Hacking and Security Costs, 124 SCIENCE NEWS, Nov. 1983 at
294.
100. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (right to be free of unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into the privacy of one's home).
101. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981).
102. The Supreme Court later granted certiorari in the Sony case and held that
home taping of television programs off the air for the purpose of "time-shifting" was a fair
use. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
103. The court of appeals decided the Sony case on October, 19, 1981. H.R. 4808,
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These first bills dealt solely with videotaping and sought only to
overturn the Sony decision.
The Home Recording Act of 198210 and the Home Recording
Act of 1983,105 sought to exempt in-home taping of audio and
visual works from copyright liability. 106 Finally, in 1985, the
Home Audio Recording Act'0 7 which exempted only home audio
taping from copyright liability was introduced. 0 8 This 1985 bill
was approved by a Senate Subcommittee; but by the end f the
99th Congress in October 1986 there had been no further action
on the bill. However, in view of the fact that Congress has seri-
ously considered anti-copy chip legislation, 109 such a blanket ex-
emption will not likely be favored." 0 Also, such an exemption ig-
nores the interests of the sound recording copyright owners.
A second solution is to establish a system of royalty payments
to copyright owners in return for an exemption or a compulsory
license"' to record copyrighted works. An example of such a bill
was the Home Audio Recording Act introduced in the U.S. Sen-
ate in the 99th Congress." 2 This bill provided that home audio
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) and S. 1758 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) were both introduced
on October, 21, 1981. S. 1758 suggested the following amendment to the Copyright Act:
Section 119. Limitation on exclusive rights:
Exemption for certain video recordings notwithstanding the provisions of section
106, it is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to record copyrighted
works on a video recorder if-
(1) the recording is made for a private use; and
(2) the recording is not used in a commercial nature.
104. H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (introduced 3/3/82).
105. H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced 1/27/83), and S. 31, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced 1/26/83).
106. Unlike S. 1758 (supra note 103) which sought only to overturn Sony, these bills
contained compulsory licensing provisions with royalty payments to be paid to and distrib-
uted by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. See supra notes 104-05.
107. H.R. 2911, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (introduced 6/27/85) and S.1739, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (introduced 10/7/85).
108. This bill also contained a compulsory license provision with royalty payments to
be made to and distributed by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Id. (The bill will be dis-
cussed further at infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text, and section VII).
109. H.R. 1384, with a change in the sunset provision to one year, was approved by
a House subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness on Au-
gust 3, 1987. See supra note 87.
110. In fact, all of the previous bills in favor of a blanket exemption failed in Con-
gress for lack of action.
111. The exclusive rights granted to copyright owners is currently modified by com-
pulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright Act in four situations: § 111 (d) Compulsory
License for Secondary Transmissions by Cable Systems; § 115 Compulsory License for
Nondramatic Musical Works (refers to works per se and not to copyrighted phonorecords);
§ 116 Compulsory License for Public Performance on Coin-operated Phonorecord Players;
and § 118 Compulsory License in Connection with Noncommercial Broadcasting. 17
U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116 & 118 (1982).
112. S. 1739, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See supra notes 106-07 and accompany-
ing text. S. 1739 provides:
§ 119. Limitation of Liability: Audio Recording
1988]
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(a) AUDIO RECORDING.-Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(1), an
individual who makes an audio recording of a musical work or a sound recording
is exempt from any liability for infringement of copyright if the recording made is
for the private use of that individual or members of his or her immediate house-
hold: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall exempt from liability a
person who, for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the making of audio recordings by any individ-
ual or entity.
(b) Compulsory License for Audio Recording Devices and Media.-
(1) AVAILABILITY OF COMPULSORY LICENSE.-Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 106(1), the importation into and distribution in the United States, and the
manufacture and distribution in the United States, of any audio recording device
or audio recording medium shall be subject to compulsory licensing if the importer
or manufacturer of the device or medium records the notice, and deposits the
statement of account and total royalty fees, specified by this paragraph.
(2)(A) INFRINGEMENT.-Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), the
importation into and distribution in the United States, or the manufacture and
distribution in the United States, of any audio recording device or audio recording
medium is actionable as an act of infringement under section 501, and is fully
subject to the remedies provided by sections 502 through 506, 509 and 511, if the
notice, statement of account, or total royalty fee specified by paragraph (1) has
not been recorded or deposited, or if the statement of account or royalty fee does
not materially comply with the requirements of paragraph (1) or any regulations
prescribed thereunder.
( 3) DEPOSIT OF ROYALTY FEEs.-The Register shall receive all fees deposited
under this section and, after deducting reasonable administrative costs, shall de-
posit the balance in the Treasury of the United States, in such manner as the
Secretary of the Treasury shall direct. All funds held by such Secretary shall be
invested in interest-bearing United States securities for later distribution with in-
terest by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (hereinafter in this section referred to as
the "Tribunal") as provided by this title. The Register shall promptly submit to
the Tribunal a compilation of all statements of account covering the pertinent
periods provided by paragraph (1).
(4) COPYRIGHT OWNERS ENTITLED TO ROYALTY FEEs.-The royalty fees depos-
ited pursuant to this section in connection with audio recording devices and media
shall, in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (5), be distributed
to the owners of copyrights in musical works and sound recordings that were in-
cluded in radio or television transmissions, or distributed to the public in the form
of phonorecords or copies, during the period to which such fees pertain.
(5) DISTRIBUTION OF ROYALTY FEE.-The royalty fees deposited pursuant to
this section shall be distributed in accordance with the following procedures:
(A) During the 30-day period specified by the Tribunal for each year in which
this section becomes effective, every person claiming to be entitled to compulsory
license fees under paragraph (4) of this subsection shall file a claim with the Tri-
bunal for fees covered by all statements of account for periods during the preced-
ing year in accordance with requirements that the Tribunal shall prescribe by reg-
ulation. All such claimants shall negotiate in good faith among themselves in an
effort to agree to a voluntary proposal for the distribution of royalty fees.
(c) ROYALTY FEES.-
(1)(A) AUDIO RECORDING DEVIcES.-The royalty fee payable under subsection
(b) for each audio recording device imported into or distributed in the United
States, or manufactured and distributed in the United States, shall be five per
centum of the price charged for the first domestic sale of such device.
(B) DUAL AUDIO RECORDING DEVICES.- The royalty fee payable under subsec-
tion (b) for each dual audio recording device imported into and distributed in the
[Vol. 25
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recording for private use would be exempt from copyright.,," In
return for this exemption, royalty fees, payable to the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal,1 4 were to be imposed on manufacturers of re-
cording equipment and recording media. 1 5 These fees would then
be distributed to copyright owners by the Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal.11 6 This second approach, as exemplified in the Home Audio
Recording Act of 1985, is the better approach. A royalty payment
in return for exemption is preferable over an unqualified exemp-
tion because it provides a better balance between the right of the
copyright owners to be compensated and the right of the public to
have access to new technology.
VII. ROYALTY SOLUTION REVISITED
There are several sections of the Home Audio Recording Act of
1985 (S. 1739, "the Act") which may have been the cause of its
failure in Congress and which, if corrected, would present a more
Unites States, or manufactured and distributed in the United States, shall be
twenty-five per centum of the price charged for the first domestic sale of such
device.
(C) AUDIO RECORDING MEDIA.-The royalty fee payable under subsection (b)
for each audio recording medium imported into and distributed in the United
States, or manufactured and distributed in the United States, shall be one cent per
minute of the maximum playing time or fraction thereof for such medium.
(D) ExEPTIONS.-The Tribunal shall by regulation exempt from royalty fees
particular kinds of audio recording devices or audio recording media ... that the
Tribunal finds ... are unsuitable for making audio recordings by individuals for
private use.
('2)(A) ADJUSTMENT OF ROYALTY FEE.-The fees specified in paragraph (1)
shall be subject to adjustment by the Tribunal in the fifth calendar year after the
date this section becomes effective, and in each subsequent fifth calendar
year ....
113. Id.
114. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal was created to make determinations concern-
ing the adjustment of reasonable copyright royalty rates as provided in §§ 111, 115, 116, &
118 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-10 (1982).
115. S. 1739, supra note 112. Payment of these royalty fees would exempt the manu-
facturers from contributory infringement claims. This cost would, of course, be passed
along to the consumer, so that the allegedly infringing consumer ultimately pays for the
privilege of copying copyrighted sound recordings.
116. Id. Currently, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) control performance copyrights to most musi-
cal works produced in the United States. ASCAP and BMI are private enterprises and are
not associated with the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. A copyright owner of a song licenses
his performance right to one of these organizations, which in turn issues a blanket license
to radio and television stations. These stations may then broadcast any title in the ASCAP
or BMI catalogue. The fee these stations pay is usually based on a percentage of the sta-
tion's gross receipts. ASCAP and BMI then distribute these fees, minus their commission,
to the original copyright owners based on the frequency with which the copyrighted work is
broadcast. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the
Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1532-33 (1982).
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acceptable form of the bill. The first problem area is in the use of
the term "compulsory licensing. 11 7 The idea behind this compul-
sory licensing provision is that owners of copyrights in sound re-
cordings will be required to give recording equipment manufactur-
ers a license to sell their equipment (capable of reproducing the
copyrighted works) upon payment of a royalty fee.'18 The manu-
facturers, however, are not conducting the actual infringing activ-
ity; consumers are."19 Giving copyright owners such control over a
separate industry goes well beyond the original purpose of grant-
ing these copyrights. 20 A royalty fee based on, and added to, the
cost of the recording equipment at the time of sale, thus paid by
the consumer directly, would be a more fitting solution. 2' The
cost of this solution falls directly upon the actual infringer and the
infringer pays only for the quality of the recording equipment he
desires.122
117. S. 1739, supra note 112, at § 119(b)(1). See also supra note 111. As discussed
previously, the use of a copyrighted work that violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder is an infringement of the copyright. A copyright owner may grant permis-
sion to others to use the copyrighted work in a manner that would otherwise constitute
infringement. Usually this permission is granted in the form of a license to the user in
return for a royalty fee paid by the user.
118. S. 1739, supra note 112, at § 119(b)(1). Distribution of such equipment with-
out payment of the royalty fee would constitute infringement and would entitle the copy-
right owner to remedies as prescribed by the statute. Id. at § 119(b)(2)(A).
119. True, but sound recording equipment manufacturers are benefitting because
consumers purchase this sound recording equipment, which in turn enables the consumer to
conduct the infringing activity; but so are the copyright owners benefitting from the new
technology that the manufacturers provide because consumers buy sound recordings in new
formats to use with this new technology.
120. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The Copyright Act has ac-
complished this by granting a limited monopoly to the copyright owner. "The monopoly
privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. . . .It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). "The copyright law ...
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration." Unites States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
121. That the public is willing to pay for the ability to listen to high quality audio
entertainment is evidenced by the enormous amount of money spent on audio equipment.
122. If manufacturers were required to pay royalties based on the cost of the total
amount of high quality sound recording equipment they sell (as per S. 1739), then a manu-
facturer can spread this cost among all of its retail items. Thus, a manufacturer could
assign some of the cost to those tape players used for recording conversations, lectures,
phone messages, computer data, etc. (i.e. those not intended for high quality taping). A
reason for doing this lies in the fact that in order to keep sales of high quality audio
equipment up a manufacturer will want to try to keep the retail cost of such products
down. Distributing the costs as such makes certain business sense, but ignores the very
purpose for imposition of such a royalty fee (i.e. to charge infringers for a license to copy).
Purchasers of the lesser quality items would be unwittingly paying for the benefit of the
purchaser of the high quality equipment, though he (the purchaser of lesser quality items)
22
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A second problem with the Act is that it names the Register of
Copyright and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal as administrators
of the statute. 23 Collection and distribution of copyright royalties
is sure to be an expensive undertaking because of the formalities
and paperwork involved.124 The Register of Copyrights and Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal are currently responsible for the collection
and distribution of royalties under sections 111 and 116 of the
Copyright Act. 2 5 For all other copyrights, it is up to the owner of
the copyright to monitor the uses made of his copyrighted work
and the collection of his own royalty fees. A better mechanism for
administration may be the use of private enterprises such as AS-
CAP and BMI. 2 These agencies have long been accepted by the
recording industry and have a wealth of past experience in the
collection and distribution of copyright royalties. Private enter-
prises, being of a for-profit nature, are also more likely to be cost
efficient which is beneficial to all parties involved in the process.
The final area of the Act in need of revision concerns the
amount of royalty fees to be imposed. 27 Sound recording copy-
right owners and private enterprises in charge of administration
will need to negotiate the amount of royalties. Final approval by
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal or Congress' 28 should be required
probably will not use such equipment for infringing uses.
123. S. 1739, supra note 112, at § 119(b)(3).
124. Id.
125. Collection and distribution of royalties is now conducted by these two agencies
under § Ill (cable television systems) and § 116 (jukeboxes) of the Copyright Act. The
agencies are each permitted to deduct reasonable costs incurred by them in conducting
their designated tasks. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 116 (1982). Yet, it seems the royalties paid
are themselves barely enough to cover the cost of completing the paperwork involved. For
example, a person desiring a license for a jukebox must file an application with the Regis-
ter of Copyrights and pay a royalty fee of eight dollars. § 1 16(b)(1)(A). After the Register
receives this fee, reasonable costs are deducted and the rest is placed in the Treasury of the
United States. § 116(c)(1). The Register must submit an annual detailed statement of
account covering all fees received by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Id. In order to re-
ceive royalties from the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, a copyright owner must file a claim
with the Tribunal. § 116(c)(2). If everything is in order the Tribunal, after deducting rea-
sonable administrative costs, will distribute the appropriate royalties to the copyright
owner. § 116(c)(3). Eight dollars paid cannot possibly cover all the administrative costs
involved in this process. Both the Register of Copyright, as director of the Copyright Of-
fice, and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, as an independent legislative agency, are govern-
ment (and thus taxpayer) funded. Are government funds (taxpayer dollars) used to assist
copyright owners to collect their royalties? Also, evidence of the inefficiency of the system
currently used is a two-year delay in distribution of cable royalties. This has led some
experts to urge a return to a "free market system to avoid complexities, needless bureau-
cracy, and unfairness to copyright owners." Leaffer, The Betamax Case: Another Compul-
sory License in Copyright Law, 13 U. ToL L. REv. 651, 686 n.164 (1982).
126. Discussed previously supra note 116.
127. S. 1739, supra note 112, at § 119(c).
128. Between the two, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal seems the more qualified.
The Tribunal was created with this kind of purpose in mind. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (establish-
ment and purpose of Tribunal).
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to see that this royalty serves only the purposes of granting the
copyright and protecting the consumer. Reconsideration of these
fees should be made every two years as opposed to every five years
as suggested by the bill129 because of the rapid changes occurring
in the audio field. The five percent royalty on audio recording de-
vices suggested by the Act seems reasonable at this time,3 0 but
the twenty-five percent royalty on dual recorders seems quite
high.131 The proposed rate of one cent for each minute of playing
time on a blank tape is also quite high.132 Another consideration is
that not all blank tapes are used to record copyrighted sound re-
cordings. 33 It would be more reasonable to place a royalty only on
high quality blank tapes, because these are more often used for
taping sound recordings.3 Overall, it would be much better to err
on the low side with respect to royalty fees until it can be deter-
mined how the system will be tolerated.
CONCLUSION
Home audio recording of copyrighted works presents some diffi-
cult issues. These issues cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the
traditional application of the fair use analysis. An alternative leg-
islative solution is in order. The proposed anti-copy chip is a quick
answer but it does not square well with the purpose of granting a
copyright to the author. The enforcement problems involved with
the anti-copy chip are also great. Moreover, the anti-copy chip
denies the public access to useful applications of new technology.
129. S. 1739, supra note 112, at § 119(c)(2)(A).
130. For example, a consumer can purchase a good quality cassette recorder for
$200. A five percent royalty would equal $10. If this recorder had an average life of 10
years, this means that the consumer is paying $1 per year for the privilege of recording as
many copyrighted works for his personal use as he wishes.
131. Dual recorders are certainly built to make it convenient for the home recorder
to make copies of other tapes, but it cannot be said that the home recorder is always
making copies of copyrighted music. Also, such recorders for home use, are more often
used to listen to, rather than to record music. It must be remembered that the purpose of
imposing this royalty is not to damage audio equipment sales. Rather, the purpose is to
provide some compensation to sound recording copyright owners for infringing uses made
of their works.
132. This would add $.90 to the cost of a 90-minute blank tape. Assume the cost of a
tape were $1.50, and sold at retail for $2.00 (in actuality, probably less). Adding $.90 to
the $2.00 retail price gives the consumer an actual retail price of $2.90 for the tape. This is
almost 50% more than the consumer would pay without the royalty fee added. The market
for blank tapes is very cost sensitive and such a high royalty might place too great a bur-
den on blank tape manufacturers.
133. For example, those tapes used to record lectures, phone messages, computer
programs, etc.
134. The proposed bill also provided some exemptions from royalties for recording
devices (for example, small tape recorders used mainly to record conversations, lectures,
etc.) and media that are not used for the purpose of recording from copyrighted sound
recordings. S. 1739, supra note 112, at § 119(b).
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A royalty solution seems to best represent the needs and concerns
of all parties involved. It compensates the copyright owners for
their works, it avoids the enforcement problems involved with the
anti-copy devices, and it provides the public with useful access to
new technology. Also, such a solution is more easily adaptable to
new technology as it arises. Congress should seriously consider
these advantages, along with the suggestions made in this Com-
ment, when it decides the fate of DAT.
Would it be too much to hope that, recognizing that they are all
part of the same process, the users of copyrighted sound record-
ings could accept the principle of performance royalties, and
could sit down with the performers and record makers to work
out a reasonable compulsory licensing system? The alternative,
no one need be told, is years more of wrangling in the legislative
arena, with people pitted against each other who should be
working together for their mutual profit."35
Therese A. Ehlke**
135. S. REP. No. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (statement of Barbara Ringer, Reg-
ister of Copyrights).
** This Comment is dedicated to my wonderful parents, Donald and Janice Larson.
A special thanks, also, to my husband, Steve, for his love and support.
1988]
25
Ehlke: Disc, DAT and Fair Use: Time To Reconsider?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
26
California Western Law Review, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss1/5
